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consumer is represented by an attorney .

.

. ."

15 U.S.C. §

1692c(a)(2).
CheckRite admitted that it communicated with Johnson after it
had received notice that he was
represented by an attorney. CheckRite argued that under section 1-1115(b) of the Wyoming statutes, it
was required to send notice of the
dishonored check directly to the
consumer. CheckRite also argued
that this type of "formal" communication was not the type of communication prohibited by section
1692c(a)(2). The court rejected this
argument because the FDCPA did
not provide an exception for "formal" communications. Thus, the
court held that the second notice
should have been sent to Johnson's
attorney, and the direct communication with Johnson was an additional violation of the FDCPA.
Using a "Doing Business As"
Name. The court rejected Johnson's allegation that CheckRite violated section 1692e(14) of the
FDCPA by sending the initial demand letter without advising him
of its true name ("Statewide Collections, Inc.") or that it was using
a "doing business as" name
("CheckRite"). Section 1692e(14)
expressly prohibits a debt collector
from deceiving or misleading a
debtor by using any name other
than its true business name in its
collection activities. The court
noted that Statewide Collections,
Inc. was a franchisee of CheckRite,
Ltd. and was licensed with the
Wyoming State Collection Agency
Board as "Statewide Collections,
Inc., d/b/a CheckRite." Therefore,
CheckRite constituted part of
Statewide Collections' true business name for the purposes of the
FDCPA.
Collecting on Behalf of Another.
Johnson also argued that CheckRite violated section 1692j of the
FDCPA because CheckRite failed
to notify Johnson that it was no
longer the true holder of the check
which allegedly created the debt.
Section 1692j prohibits any action
which would mislead the consumer
to believe that someone other than
the creditor is attempting to collect
the debt. The court rejected Johnson's argument because CheckRite
never attempted to mislead JohnVolume 2, Number 2/Winter, 1990

son into believing that it was collecting the debt on its own behalf.
Rather, it was obvious that CheckRite was collecting the debt for the
retail merchant. Therefore, the
court held that CheckRite did not
violate section 1692j of the
FDCPA.
The court reversed the district
court's decision and reinstated the
county court's judgment.
Joseph J. Morford

Supreme Court of New
Jersey Holds Delaware
Chemical Company
Subject to the
Jurisdiction of the Board
of Public Utility
Commissioners
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that a chemical company with a limited market is a
public utility subject to regulation
by the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners. Petition of South
Jersey Gas Co., 561 A.2d 561 (N.J.
1989). The court found that the
company's contract to supply
methane-rich fuel to a large industrial user, coupled with the company's extensive efforts to market
the gas to other industrial users,
met the New Jersey legislature's
definition of "public utility."
Background
SunOlin Oil Company ("SunOlin") operated a chemical plant
in Claymont, Delaware, that converted oil refinery by-products into
industrial gases. This process
produced methane-rich fuel
("MRF"). MRF is an alternative
energy source to natural gas and is
generally suitable for industrial but
not residential uses.
B.F. Goodrich Company
("Goodrich") manufactured its
products in Pedricktown, New Jersey. Until 1986, Goodrich used
natural gas in its manufacturing
process. This natural gas was supplied by South Jersey Natural Gas
("South Jersey"), a regulated public utility that served approxi-

mately 180,000 residential, industrial, and commercial customers in
seven southern counties of New
Jersey. Sixteen industrial customers represented approximately
twenty percent of South Jersey's
total sales.
In July of 1983, Goodrich contacted SunOlin after Goodrich unsuccessfully attempted to enter
into an arrangement with South
Jersey for a long term supply of
natural gas. SunOlin offered to sell
MRF to Goodrich as an alternative
to natural gas. However, SunOlin
subsequently concluded that a contract with Goodrich would not be
profitable and the transaction was
never completed. By the fall of
1985, SunOlin was able to deliver
MRF to Goodrich using a previously unavailable pipeline. SunOlin again made an offer to sell
MRF to Goodrich. Goodrich estimated that it could save $18,000
per month by converting to MRF.
SunOlin viewed the potential contract with Goodrich as an opportunity to expand the market for
MRF.
While the contract with Goodrich was being negotiated, SunOlin
contacted other potential industrial customers, such as E.I. Dupont Nemours and Company,
Mobil Oil Research, Monsanto
Chemical Company, Shell Oil
Company, Allied Chemical and
Atlantic City Electric Company, in
an effort to sell MRF. However, no
other agreements to sell MRF were
ever reached.
In late 1986, SunOlin and Goodrich reached a preliminary agreement. Goodrich subsequently notified South Jersey that it intended
to terminate its contract for natural gas as of March 1, 1987. On
February 13, 1987, South Jersey
commenced proceedings with the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners ("the BPU"), the agency
authorized to regulate New Jersey
utilities. South Jersey sought a preliminary restraining order to prohibit SunOlin from selling and
delivering MRF to Goodrich.
Administrative Proceedings
In March 1987, the BPU transferred South Jersey's petition to
the Office of Administrative Law
(continued on page 56)
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Public Utility Commissioners (from page 55)
to determine whether SunOlin
qualified as a "public utility" and
therefore was subject to regulation
by the BPU. A "public utility" is
any corporation that "may own,
operate, manage, or control within
[New Jersey] any pipeline [or] gas.
. . plant or equipment for public

use, under privileges granted... by
[New Jersey]." N.J. Stat. Ann. §
48:2-13 (Supp. 1989). At a hearing
before an Administrative Law
Judge ("AL"), SunOlin stipulated
that it owned and operated pipelines in New Jersey. Thus, the sole
issue was whether SunOlin's activities were "for public use."
The AL applied the definition
of a public utility from Lewandowski v. Brookwood Musconetcong River Property Owners Association, 37 N.J. 433, 181 A.2d 506
(1962), which states that "whether
an entity is a public utility depends
on the character and extent of the
use." The AL determined that the
character of SunOlin's use was to
sell MRF only to the most profitable industrial users. The extent of
SunOlin's use at the time was only
one customer, but that use would
cause South Jersey to lose $1.3
million in revenues and the state of
New Jersey to lose $210,000.00 in
taxes. This, in turn, could have
resulted in a $400,000 rate increase
for other South Jersey customers.
The ALJ concluded that SunOlin's
sales were substantial enough to be
of consequence to the public and,
therefore, SunOlin was a public
utility within the BPU's jurisdiction.
The case then was returned to
the BPU for a final decision on the
merits. The BPU decided to exercise its jurisdiction over SunOlin
because SunOlin's sales to Goodrich were sufficiently "clothed in
the public interest" to warrant regulation. The BPU reasoned that it
needed to regulate SunOlin to
avoid potentially adverse effects
on the regulated market for natural
gas in New Jersey. The BPU concluded that its authority to regulate
competition under sections 48:214 and 48:2-17 of the New Jersey
56

statutes included the ability to exclude competitors from the natural
gas market.
New Jersey Appellate Division
The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the BPU's decision,
noting that the economic impact of
SunOlin's selling only to the largest
and most profitable customers sufficiently affected the public interest to justify regulation. The court
rejected SunOlin's argument that,
as a private company, it had no
duty to provide service to the
public and thus should be exempt
from regulation by the BPU. The
court explained that the issue was
not whether SunOlin was obligated
to sell MRF in New Jersey but the
consequences to the regulated natural gas market if SunOlin did sell
MRF in New Jersey. The court
concluded that because SunOlin's
sales had a potentially substantial
impact on the natural gas market,
the BPU had jurisdiction to regulate SunOlin's activities.
SunOlin appealed the decision
to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The New Jersey Supreme Court
Affirms
The New Jersey Supreme Court
began its analysis with an overview
of the BPU's regulatory power.
The BPU has the authority to grant
franchises and privileges to any
public utility and to "oversee utilities to prevent abuse of their franchise and to ensure that consumers
are provided with safe and adequate services at reasonable rates."
South Jersey, 561 A.2d at 565. A
business is a "public utility" within
the BPU's jurisdiction if the business operates "for public use."
Lewandowski v. Brookwood Musconetcong River Property Owners
Assoc., 37 N.J. 433, 181 A.2d 506
(1962). Whether a business operates "for public use" depends on
"the character and extent of the
use" (37 N.J. at 445, 181 A.2d at
513), including the potential scope
of the business' market (37 N.J. at
447, 181 A.2d at 514).
Although the facts in Lewandowski were distinguishable from

the present case, the court cited
analogous cases from other jurisdictions which applied the "public
use" test. In Industrial Gas Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio, 135 Ohio St. 408, 21 N.E.2d
166 (1939), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that a natural gas company which purposely limited its
market was subject to public utility
regulation. The Industrial Gas
court reasoned that if selective
contracting precluded public utility regulations, the business could
multiply the number of its customers without ever being subject to
regulation. Rather, the test was
whether the business served such a
substantial part of the public as to
make its rates and operations a
matter of public concern. 135 Ohio
St. at 412-14, 21 N.E.2d at 168.
In Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Co. v. Michigan Public Service
Commission, 328 Mich. 650, 44
N.W.2d 324 (1950), aft'd, 341 U.S.
329 (1951), the Michigan Supreme
Court held that a natural gas company which contracted solely with
Ford Motor Company and a few
other industrial users was subject
to public utility regulation. The
Panhandlecourt reasoned that regulation was warranted because the
company's selective contracts disadvantaged the regulated utilities
in the area. 328 Mich. at 664, 44
N.W.2d at 330.
The court in the present case
also examined several economic
and regulatory factors. The court
acknowledged the conflict between
limiting SunOlin's entry into the
market and promoting the New
Jersey Energy Master Plan's objectives of enhancing competition in
the natural gas industry. However,
the court concluded that this apparent conflict did not affect the
BPU's jurisdiction but rather gave
the BPU the responsibility of reconciling these two conflicting
goals to achieve the lowest prices
and the best service possible for
New Jersey consumers.
Finally, the court rejected SunOlin's argument that the BPU imposed its jurisdiction solely beVolume 2, Number 2fWinter, 1990
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cause SunOlin had taken business
away from South Jersey, a regulated utility, and not because of the
character and extent of SunOlin's
sales. The court found sufficient
evidence in the record from which
to conclude that SunOlin's actions
warranted regulation. The court
noted that in making this determination, the BPU was obligated to
consider SunOlin's sales potential
and marketing efforts in determining the "character and effect" of
SunOlin's business. SunOlin had a
supply of MRF equivalent to twothirds of South Jersey's industrial
volume. In addition, SunOlin
could interconnect its pipelines to
pose a substantial threat to South
Jersey's industrial service area. In
fact, SunOlin had solicited business from numerous South Jersey
industrial users. The court held
that the BPU properly concluded
that SunOlin posed a substantial
threat to South Jersey's industrial
market and therefore SunOlin was
a public utility within the BPU's
jurisdiction.
Suzi Guemmer

The North Carolina
Motor Vehicle Safety
and Financial
Responsibility Act
Allows an Insured Party
to Aggregate Separate
Underinsured Motorist
Insurance Coverages
In a case of first impression, the
North Carolina Supreme Court
held that by statute, a motorist who
purchases underinsured motorist
coverage for more than one vehicle, whether in one policy or in
several policies, may combine all
the coverages when making a claim
on any one of the vehicles. Sutton v
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 325 N.C.
259, 382 S.E.2d 759 (1989). The
court held that insured parties
could do so even if their insurance
policies specifically prohibit aggregating coverages because such prohibitions conflict with North Carolina statutory law.
Volume 2, Number 2/Winter, 1990

Background
Over the past several years, underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage has become a common type
of insurance protection. UIM coverage compensates the insured
party for expenses in excess of the
tortfeasor's insurance coverage. In
this way, UIM coverage protects
the innocent victims of financially
irresponsible motorists.
In 1985, North Carolina
amended section 20-279.21(b)(4)
of its Motor Vehicle Safety and
Financial Responsibility Act, N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 20-279.1 to .39 (1988)
("the Act"), to address situations
where owners purchase more than
one UIM coverage, whether within
a single policy or in several different policies. The amendment provided that in these multiple-coverage situations, the maximum protection would be "the total limits
of the owner's underinsured motorist coverages provided in the
owner's policies of insurance."
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21 (b)(4).
The legislature stated that it added
this section to give the owner of
UIM coverage the benefits of each
coverage he or she purchased.
Facts
Sherry S. Sutton ("Sutton") purchased two auto insurance policies
from Aetna Casualty & Insurance
Company ("Aetna"). The first policy contained two separate coverages, one for a Buick and the other
for a Chevrolet. Each coverage
included $50,000 basic bodily injury coverage as well as $50,000
per person UIM coverage. The
second policy covered two additional autos, a Plymouth and a
Chevrolet pickup truck. The second policy differed from the first
policy in that both its basic bodily
injury coverages and its UIM coverages had a $100,000 per person
maximum for each auto. Aetna
charged separate premiums for the
UIM coverage on each of Sutton's
four vehicles. Both policies contained the following provision:
The limit of bodily injury
liability.., for "each person",
for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of
liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one

person in any one auto accident... This is the most we will
pay for bodily injury and property damage regardless of the
number of.

.

. [v]ehicles or

premiums shown in the [policy] ....
On May 31, 1986, Sutton was
driving one of her insured autos
when a vehicle driven by Anthony
A. Genesio ("Genesio") crashed
into her car. Genesio died in the
accident and Sutton was injured.
Sutton sued Genesio's estate for
the injuries she suffered in the
accident.
Genesio carried liability insurance of $50,000, the entirety of
which his insurance company deposited with the court for Sutton's
benefit. However, Sutton claimed
in excess $70,000 in medical expenses plus a substantial loss of
future income due to her inability
to return to work. Consequently,
she notified Aetna that she expected her UIM coverages to provide the difference between Genesio's $50,000 insurance coverage
and the amount of her eventual
judgment. Citing the policy provisions, Aetna informed Sutton that
it would only provide $50,000 in
UIM coverage, which was the
amount she purchased for the car
that was hit. Sutton sued Aetna in
the North Carolina Superior Court
of Hanover County seeking a declaration that she was entitled to
aggregate all four of her UIM coverages in her two policies.
Superior Court of Hanover County
Aetna maintained that the terms
of the policy controlled the dispute. The policy explicitly stated
that Aetna's liability was limited to
the amount of the single coverage
for the auto which Sutton was
driving when she was hit. Thus,
Aetna argued that Sutton could
only claim UIM coverage in the
amount of $50,000.
Sutton argued that the Act overrode the terms of the policies. She
argued that the Act allowed her to
aggregate her coverages in both
policies and thereby claim a total
UIM coverage of $300,000: $50,000 each for the two autos in her
first policy and $100,000 each for
the two autos in her second policy.
(continued on page 58)

57

